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Approved For Release 2002/08/20 : CIA-RDP79B01737A000100010001-9

Indicate Task Force

11 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
THROUGH : Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : DDI Task Force in Support of the
Presidential Trip, 22 July -
3 August 1969

25X1A 1. The Deputy Director for Intelligence on 30 June established a DDI Task Force (DDI Notice No. 50-58) to provide current intelligence back-up for the President's trip to Asia and Romania. [redacted] was named Chief of this Task Force, which was to remain in being until the President returned to the United States on 3 August 1969. Operating guidelines for the Task Force, including a personnel roster, is attached as Appendix A.

2. Before the President departed on 22 July, the White House requested, through the Department of State, that Fact Books be prepared on each country to be visited--the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and Romania. The Fact Books were prepared by OCI and OER under OCI supervision and in coordination with State, and were delivered to State on 9 July. CRS kept the Task Force informed on its [redacted] reports prepared at State Department and Secret Service request. In addition, pertinent intelligence memoranda and special articles concerning several of the countries to be visited were selected or especially written for White House background use. These reports, delivered to the White House 14-15 July, are listed in Appendix B.

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3. Task Force personnel also coordinated drafts of SNIE 4-69 on security conditions in the countries to be visited and participated in Board

NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File


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meetings on this estimate. Upon publication of the SNIE, the Task Force assumed responsibility for current reporting on security conditions with emphasis on possible local hostile actions that could either endanger the President or embarrass him during the trip. Security memoranda, coordinated with ONE and the Clandestine Service, were published on a pre-departure schedule of 14, 17 and 21 July.

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[redacted] The Task Force also established contact points with all concerned DDI components, with ONE, and with the Clandestine Service operating divisions for rapid, coordinated support to the Presidential party.

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5. The Task Force began 24 hour operations on 22 July at 1600 in the Task Force room of the Operations Center. The majority of personnel were assigned to the 0800-1630 shift in support of the production deadlines which were determined by the White House requirement [redacted]

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[redacted] Only one person was assigned to each of the 1600-2400 and 2400-0800 shifts, in the anticipation that, because the bulk of substantive work would be done during the 0800-1630 shift, only monitoring coverage would be necessary. This expectation proved to be the case. The scheduling of personnel to approximately four days duty each was designed to minimize the impact on normal

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operations of the OCI branches involved and when possible, to have analysts on duty to handle reporting on countries on which they specialize. Also, a few new or junior analysts were included to expose them to this kind of operation. All Task Force personnel were drawn from OCI [REDACTED]

6. On 23 July daily production of the security memorandum was begun and a daily situation report was initiated. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The daily sitrep focused on developments relating to the countries to be visited by the President. Close coordination with the OCI production staff was maintained to preclude duplication of reporting carried in the PDB and CIB black book which were delivered to the Presidential party simultaneously. Task Force memoranda was transmitted electrically to the White House, to the standard recipients in the intelligence community, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The security memoranda were published in hard copy to the community, and the daily sitreps were given only internal hard copy distribution.

7. Although the Task Force was prepared to disseminate Spot reports if warranted, there was no occasion to do so.

8. The Task Force functioned smoothly, efficiently, and without experiencing any "flaps." This was primarily due to the absence of any crisis developments; but also the lead time available made it possible to organize all the mechanical and procedural details, select and brief the concerned personnel, and draw on the experience of earlier presidential trip task force records and personnel in a systematic and comprehensive

way. To be noted in particular was the excellent support and knowhow provided by the Operations Center, the quality of personnel assigned to the Task Force, and the consistently close and full cooperation received from all Organization components.



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9. The Task Force production is on file in the Presentations Branch, Publications Staff, OCL.



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Attachments:

Appendix A
Appendix B



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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 11 Aug 69
TO: DOCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: [REDACTED]		
ROOM NO. 5G19	BUILDING Hqs	[REDACTED]
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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Appendix A

18 July 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Presidential Trip DDI Task Force;
22 July - 3 August

REFERENCE: DDI Notice Establishing Task Force
(No. 50-58, 30 June 1969)

1. The Task Force will go into operation COB
22 July in the Operations Center.


2. The Task Force is producing follow-up security
memoranda to SNIE 4-69, with the last pre-trip memo due
21 July. Contributions for the 21 July memo will be
needed by 1030.

3. Beginning 23 July through 2 August the Task
Force will initiate a daily security memo and a daily
situation report presenting intelligence bearing on
the upcoming countries to be visited. The focus of
the daily sitrep will be those aspects of the several
country situations which would not be covered in the
PDB, the CIB Red and Black books and the Vietnam Situa-
tion Report, which will be transmitted to the President.
In effect, we will be presenting white book type ma-
terial, plus perhaps significant highlights. OCI Di-
visions concerned, [redacted] will be
responsible for preparing contributions to the daily
sitrep and security memo and should submit them to the
Task Force, initially by COB on 22 and 23 July. Sub-
sequently contributions will be required one hour prior
to publication deadline. Late items will be accepted
up to 1/2 hour prior to file time.

4. The security memo will be coordinated with ONE
and DDP. As the President departs each country, it will
be dropped from these two reports. Task Force produc-
tion will be prepared for release simultaneously with
the PDB [redacted]

[redacted] beginning with Johnston
Island. Please see the attached schedule, and the list
of names for points of contact and coordination within
Agency components.

5. Twenty-four hour manning of the Task Force will be required for the duration of the President's absence. The attached roster details Task Force personnel assignments by shifts. It should be noted that most of the Task Force production will occur during normal working hours. This means that all Agency components will be immediately available for support and that Task Force personnel can be on call to their respective Divisions.


Chief, President's Trip Task Force

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Appendix B

Publications to White House, 15 July

Intelligence Memoranda

1. Current Soviet Policy in South Asia,
14 July 1969
2. The Indonesian Communist Party, 14 July 1969
3. India's Fragmented Politics, 14 July 1969
4. The Effect of Personnel Changes on Indian
Foreign Policy, 8 March 1969
5. India's Policies Toward Southeast Asia,
7 February 1969
6. Indo-Pakistani Relations, 14 July 1969
7. Pakistani-Chinese Communist Relations,
14 July 1969
8. Pakistan Under Martial Law: The First Three
Months, 2 July 1969
9. Romania's National Communist Course, 15 July 1969

Special Report

10. Romania's Second Generation Communist Leader-
ship, 23 May 1969

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*Pres
Just for
-22R-9*

July 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HELMS

This morning the NSC Staff was called to its first staff meeting since late February 1969. Al Haig chaired it. He mentioned the following items you might find interesting:

(1) Henry Kissinger will be stopping off in Paris on 4 August to brief the French President and Premier and then on to Brussels to brief Brosio, returning to Washington Tuesday evening, 5 August, instead of Sunday night with the President.

(2) Henry and the President will be leaving for San Clemente, California, the morning of Saturday, 9 August, and are scheduled to remain there until Sunday, 7 September. A small office will be established at the Naval Base at San Clemente for Henry. A secretary (Muriel Hartley) will be there during the entire period.

(3) Al Haig will also be in San Clemente from 9 August until 20 August at which time Tony Lake, who has replaced Larry Eagleburger, will take over for the remainder of the San Clemente period.

(4) It is presently contemplated that the President will hold two NSC meetings at San Clemente: one on the 14th and one on the 29th of August. Tentatively scheduled for consideration on the 14th is Korea, and present thinking for the meeting on the 29th are possibly SALT, Vietnam, or Greece.

(5) There will be three courier planes a week carrying materials and/or personnel to San Clemente while the President is there. It is anticipated that substantive officers on the NSC Staff will be called upon to go to San Clemente for important items in their respective areas of specialty, i.e. President Park's visit with the President on 21-22 August.

(6) It is currently thought that the President will devote the bulk of his working time during the latter two weeks of his stay in San Clemente to his domestic programs.

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(7) Henry Kissinger will probably come back to Washington for two Review Group meetings on the 25th and 26th of August.

(8) Haig introduced to the staff a Lieut. Commander Jonathan Howe, who will be working with him in some way, not clearly defined. Haig thought that Howe's presence might make it possible for both Haig and Kissinger to have more time available to spend personally with the various officers on the NSC Staff. Haig then noted that he had been keeping tabs on the time Kissinger has been obliged to spend with the President since 21 January, and this amount of time has been steadily increasing; in fact, it has amounted to as much as six hours in one day. He also referred to a study which has been made on the number of action papers which have been presented to Henry Kissinger during this period. These have totalled as many as 50 actions in one day.

(9) Haig cited the above factors as the reason for Kissinger not being able to adhere to his original plan to hold two staff meetings per week and for not being able to spend as much time personally as he would like with individual officers on his staff.

(10) Haig also mentioned that the administrative controls and the staffing under Waldeman and Cole are now becoming much more efficient. They are riding close herd on a tickler system on papers for the President and questioning the length of some papers. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be necessary in the future to prepare less lengthy and detailed papers for the President's consideration than has been the case in the past. He noted, however, that Henry Kissinger will still wish to have in a covering memorandum for his information a more detailed presentation of various questions and innuendos surrounding the particular paper at hand in case he wished to discuss such factors with the President.

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cc: DDP
DDI ✓